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SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF RACIALLY
MOTIVATED POLICE MISCONDUCT
It is generally conceded that the problem of racially
discriminatory law enforcement has improved in the last twenty-five
years.' This concession, however, is more of an indictment of the past
than an approbation of the present. The 1964 New York riot and the
1967 Tampa civil upheaval were both triggered by the application of
lethal force by white policemen on black subjects.2 While incidents
like Jackson State3 invoke the nation's attention, the real tragedy lies
in the low-profile day-to-day conflict between police and black
members of the ghetto. The purpose of this comment is to analyze the
psycho-sociological causes of racially motivated police misconduct'
and examine the federal civil remedies available for redress of such
1. See, e.g., A. NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND 1 HE SHIELD: THE POLICE IN URBAN SOCIETY
(Anchor ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as NIEDERHOFFER]. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE POLICE 181-82 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE: THE POLICE].
THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL HEREINAFTER CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN
THIS COMMENT:
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDER (1968) [hereinafter
cited as KERNER COMM'N REP.];
J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
(1966) [hereinafter cited as SKOLNICK];
Fogelson, From Resentment to Confrontation: The Police, The Negroes, and the Outbreak
of the Nineteen-Sixties Riots, 83 POL. SCI. Q. 217 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Fogelson];
Hahn & Feagin, Riot-Precipitating Police Practices: Attitudes in Urban Ghettos, 31
PHYLON 183 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hahn & Feagin];
Rinella, Police Brutality and Racial Prejudice: A First Close Look, 45 J. URBAN L. 773
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Rinella].
2. See KERNER COMM'N REP. 1-3, 1-15 to -25. See generally Fogelson 217-19; Hahn, Cops
and Rioters: Ghetto Perceptions of Social Conflict and Control, V"3 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 761,
762-63 (1970); Rinella 794.
3. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST 411 (1970)
(Scranton Comm'n Rep.) vividly described the Jackson State tragedy:
Two nights of campus demonstrations at Jackson State College in May 1970 ended in
violent confrontation and tragedy. After 28 seconds of gunfire by Mississippi Highway
Safety Patrolmen and Jackson city policemen, two black youths lay dying and 12 others
were wounded.
4. The problems of racial discrimination in housing, employment, and recreation have been
treated extensively, but until recently the issue of racially motivated police misconduct has
received scant attention. Hahn & Feagin 183; Levy, Cops in the Ghetto: A Problem of the Police
System, II AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 31, 33 (1968).
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misconduct under Title 42 United States Code sections 1981 and 1983
derived respectively from the 1866 Civil Rights Act' and the 1871
Civil Rights Act.'
THE PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY LAW ENFORCEMENT
To appreciate properly the nature of the problem posed by this
comment, it is necessary to understand what transpires when a white
patrolman walks into a black ghetto. First, one must grasp the type of
policeman who usually confronts urban Negroes.
Development of the Law Enforcement Personality
While it is impossible to sketch a flawless portrait of the "typical"
policeman, statistical studies have identified certain common
characteristics inuring to the vast majority of police. Most individuals
considering law enforcement as a career perceive this vocation as a
prestigious step from their working class background 7 toward middle
class respectability and economic security. However, police
candidates characteristically exhibit strong racial prejudice' and early
studies indicated that police recruits were often of below average
intelligence.' Most large city police departments now matriculate
persons with a mean I.Q. of 100 to 10511 although ninety-five percent
of all police candidates have received no college training."
Before an individual becomes a policeman he may be subjected
to a battery of intelligence, psychological, emotional, and character
5. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted, Enforcement Act of [May 31]
1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, codified, Revised Statutes of 1878, § 1977 (2d ed.), now,
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
6. Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20. 1871. ch. 22, § 1. 17 Stat. 13, codified. Revised Statutes
of 1878, § 1979 (2d ed.), now, 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1964).
7. See NIEDERHOFFER 150. See also Cross, The Negro, Prejudice, and the Police, 55 J. CRM.
L.C. & P.S. 405. 407 (1964).
8. See SKOLNICK 80-83.
9. E.g.. Thurstone, The Intelligence of Policemen, I J. PERSONNEL RESEARCH 64 (1922).
10. NIEDERHOFFER 148.
I. Id. 39. But see TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 10 citing a national survey concluding that 24
percent of patrolmen and 31 percent of top-level department administrators have some college
education. Nearly four decades ago. a prominent New York Police Chief decried the lack of
highly trained police and advocated that the federal government establish a four year college that
would award graduates a Bachelor of Police Science degree. This college, like West Point and
Annapolis. would bear the full tuition of each candidate and would provide an "army against an
enemy from within." Speech from Andrew J. Kavanaugh to Att'y General's Conference on
Crime. Dec. 13, 1934.
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examinations, 12 but only a few police departments test for racial
prejudice.' 3 One commentator has described how the candidate,
having passed this first battery of tests, is then devastated by his
experience at a police academy.'4
The purpose of the academy is to train the recruit for his new role
of law enforcement. He is taught a gamut of subjects ranging from
law and government, first aid, and marksmanship to proper wearing
of the uniform.' The recruit is also indoctrinated in the underlying
ideals, aspirations, and professionalism which supposedly
characterize a police department. The disparity, however, between
the ideals of the academy and the experiences gleaned from veteran
police officers engenders an attitude of cynicism in the young
policeman.'" The more experienced police admonish the new
patrolmen to "'be tough," to disregard the social and philosophic
doctrines of the academy, and to remain alert to the fact that a
patrolman is evaluated by his arrest record, not his adherence to
criminal procedural safeguards.' 7
The newly commissioned policeman thus begins his career
uncertain as to the propriety of adopting the crime control or due
process of law enforcement model.'" This attitudinal tension between
12. NIEDERHOFFER 35-38. But see TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 10. Despite the high failure rate
incident to current police selection procedures, it is probable that current screening processes
eliminate potentially excellent police while admitting poorly disposed individuals. Character
investigations rarely canvass the proper scope or depth necessary to obtain information
permitting professional evaluation, and presently employed psychiatric examinations are
inadequate to detect personality defects which will inhibit judicious law enforcement under the
stress of police work. Id. at 128-3 1. Conversely, certain screening processes preclude potentially
exemplary personnel. Physical, age, and residency requirements should be relaxed. Most police
departments require that an applicant have obtained majority. This excludes recent high school
graduates who must embark upon another career, probably never again to consider being a
policeman.
13. TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 164. The lack of attention devoted to the necessity of
screening out racially biased police is illustrated by R. PERKINS, POLICE EXAMINATIONS (1947).
This elaborate book contains a comprehensive set of tests enabling administrators to evaluate
police personnel. But despite the book's thoroughness, it contains not one question testing for
racial prejudice.
14. NIEDERHOFFER 43-51.
15. Id. at 44-45.
16. Id. at 46.
17. Id. at 56, 75-77.
18. See generally Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
"[T]he Crime Control Model is based on the proposition that the repression of criminal conduct
is by far the most important function to be performed by the criminal process." Id. at 9. "If the
Crime Control Model resembles an assembly line, the Due Process Model looks very much like
an obstacle course. Each of its successive stages is designed to present formidable impediments
to carrying the accused any further along the process." Id. at 13.
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idealism and pragmatism is compounded when the policeman is
assigned to the "beat." To his chagrin he discovers in his constant
contacts with petty offenders and law-abiding citizens alike that he is
regarded with little prestige and considered lower class.'" Indeed, a
recent study of the status accorded various occupations ranked police
fifty-fourth out of ninety along with railroad conductors and
playground instructors.'"
The first assignment for nearly every new policeman is that of foot
patrolman. This task, albeit valuable as a device to assist young
policemen in gaining an awareness of the neighborhood, is a source of
frustration. The menial and dirty chores fall to the novice patrolman,
whereas the glamorous and most immediately significant cases such
as homicide are pre-empted by ranking officers in the Detective
Division.2' The demeaning nature of the foot patrolman's duty does
not preclude serious responsibility, however, and when this is
combined with the additional elements of scant prestige and slight
recognition, the patrolman becomes embittered and apathetic. 22 The
new policeman develops an anomic2 perception of society, losing his
faith in people, his enthusiasm for high police ideals, and his sense of
pride and integrity.24
The young policeman's severe symptoms of anomie, while not
entirely dissipating, gradually level off as his mental processes
19. See. e.g.. SKOLNICK 49-51, Rudwick, Police Work and the Negro. 50 J. CRII. L.C. &
P.S. 596-97 (1960).
20. A. REISS. OCCUPATIONS AND SOCIAL STATUS 56 (1961). "The low status of the police is
almost res judicata.' NIEDERHOFFER 21. In Allor v. Board of Auditors. 43 Mich. 76, 98.4 N.W.
492, 497 (1880). the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "The police force is nothing more nor less
. . . than an additional force of constables and watchmen appointed by the State for certain
limited purposes . "
21. NIEDERHOFFER 62.
22. Id. at 63. In Mark. A Police Point of View, 38 MEDIco-LEGAL J. 4. 10 (1970). the task
of the young policeman is colorfully described:
. . . To [sic] take a knife off a drunk or a shotgun off ajailbreaker, to settle a bitter ight
between two aging queers who want to chuck one another on to the street. to soothe a
woman whose husband has just hit her with a broken bottle, to do something for a child
that nobody's bothered to feed for a week. to question a pregnant teenager who's tried to
open her wrist with a chisel, to pick up an addict in terminal deterioration, to stop a white
landlord from braining a black tenant, or vice-versa: they expect 20-year old coppers to
do that.
23. Anomie is a "state of mind characterized by a sense of rootlessness." J. VANDER
ZANDEN. SOCIOLOGY: A SYSTEIMATIC APPROACH 52 (1965). One source of anomie is
particularly appropriate to the policeman's situation. Anomie results from the "disparity
between the goals held out to the members of a society and the institutionalized means by which
these goals may be achieved.- Id. at 53.
24. NIEDERHOI-FR 96.
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struggle to maintain homeostasis.25 The patrolman, through
experiences and the passage of time, toughens his mental skin,
withdraws from society, 6 and seeks solace in the semi-military police
system. The nature of his occupation impedes gratifying social
relationships, even off-duty, with anyone other than members of
fellow police families. 27 The policeman's neighbors decline intimate
friendships, fearing perhaps that casual and inadvertent references to
extralegal conduct will result in judicial sanctions. Thus confined to a
"police society," the policeman's occupation becomes not merely a
job, but a life style. 21 Moreover, in response to the concomitant
presence of danger, authority, and efficiency, the policeman develops
a "working personality. '29
The Working Personality
The first ubiquitous element in the policeman's working milieu is
danger. The constant uncertainty as to when police will be accosted by
insanity or violence magnifies the impact of this danger on the
policeman's psyche. Superimposed upon this environment of danger
is the police bureaucracy's requirement for efficiency. Despite the
denial of top-echelon police officials, it is generally acknowledged that
quota systems do exist. 31 Such systems, for example, -require a
policeman patrolling a given district to issue a specified number of
tickets within a given time period. When the system is applied in a
black ghetto, whose residents perceive police as a symbol of white
society,31 friction and ill-will increase alarmingly.
Of the three elements shaping the working personality-danger,
efficiency, and authority-the most dominant is authority. Police
solidarity fosters the crime control model32 of the criminal process at
the expense of constitutional procedural requirements. 33 The police
25. See generally F. RUCH. PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE 63 (6th ed. 1963).
26. "'Policemen,' pointed out H. L. Mencken, 'enjoy a social life almost as inbred as that of
Justices of the United States."' S. ASCH, POLICE AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHTS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL 34 (1967). See also Clark, Isolation of the Police: A Comparison of the British and
Anterican Situations. 56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 307 (1965); Mills, Commentary on the
Symposium, 60 J.'CRn. L.C. & P.S. 256 (1969) ("[P]olice have sometimes pictured themselves
as a persecuted minority. . . ; police have termed themselves 'the blue race."').
27. S. AScH, supra note 26, at 34.
28. SKOLNICK 43.
29. Id. 42-70.
30. Cf. KERNER COMM'N REP. 11-13.
31. See note I I I infra and accompanying text.
32. See note 18supra.
33. Cf. SKOLNICK 67.
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look with great disfavor upon any attempt to challenge or discredit
their self-image of authoritarianism34 nurtured by their limited
societal perspective. Indeed, a study of the police personality found
defiance to police authority to be a reason for physical response by
police.3 The explanation of this practice which severely erodes police-
civilian relations is seated in a basic psychological concept. Every
individual has a notion of the personality he presents to others, but,
more importantly, he entertains a conception of how he believes other
people perceive him 36-a conception which he consciously and
subconsciously strives to maintain in the face of attack. 37 The police, a
semi-military organization, harbor a self-image of authoritarianism 31
and forcibly rebuke any act challenging the integrity of such an
image. This authoritarianism further alienates the police from society,
thus accentuating police solidarity 3 and the self-feeding process of
increased authoritarianism.
A key element of the authoritarian personality is conventionalism,
a chauvinistic loyalty to middle class values.40 Given this political and
normative philosophy, it is easy to understand why police disparage
the lower-class morality often displayed by most black ghetto
residents 4' and why they exhibit less respect for these blacks than for
white suburbanites. The typical policeman identifies with short hair
and business suits and the mere sight of afros and head scarves
triggers hostility.42
Closely analogous to this adherence to middle-class conven-
tionality is the police attribute of political conservatism, as evidenced
34. Fogelson 230.
35. Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 Am. J. Soc. 34. 38 (1953).
36. F. RUCH. supra note 25, at 125.
37. Id. at 63. A process termed "looking-glass self" is closely related to the concept of self-
image. The initial stage in this process occurs when we develop an image of how we appear to
others. We then imagine how this appearance is judged by others. Finally, we emotionally react
to what we imagined others judged us to be. If police erroneously evaluate how others think and
judge them, their subsequent conduct will probably be inapposite. J. VANDER ZANDEN. supra
note 23, at 246-47.
38. E.g.. Fogelson 230.
39. SKOLNICK 52-58.
40. T. ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK. D. LEVINSON & R. SANORD, TIlE
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 228-30 (1950) (American Jewish Committee).
41. Rinella 783. See Allen. Pilnick & Silverzweig. Conflict Resolution -- Team Building fr
Police and Ghetto Residents. 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 251, 253 (1969) ("[A] police-held norm
about the ghetto [is that] . . . there is a general low standard of morality among the people or
the 'ghetto"').
42. See Werthman & Piliavin, Gang Members and the Police. in THL POLIcE 80 (D. Bordua
ed. 1967). cited in TASK FORCE: THE POLICE: 185.
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by support of George Wallace in the 1968 Presidential campaign.13
Police, if not members of the John Birch Society, are often
sympathetic to the organization's philosophy,44 which includes
elements of racial and religious prejudice. 5 It is difficult to perceive
how a policeman wholeheartedly supporting the Society's platform
could act impartially and judiciously when confronted with an
insolent, yet law-abiding, black youth.
Despite the policeman's disposition toward conventionalism, he
seldom exhibits strong puritanical morality. As guardians of
dominant social mores, however, police are required to enforce
middle-class morality reflected in crimes such as drunkenness,
statutory rape, 47 and public profanity. The disparity between the
policeman's disposition and his law enforcement duties thus leaves
him vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy.
Ghetto Perceptions, Police Professionalism, and Black Police
Another significant police characteristic pertinent to the ability to
perform equitably and efficiently in a black community is perception
of the ghetto resident. The issue here is whether police react with
verbal and physical abuse to actual or to merely imagined black
hostility. If the reaction is to the latter, the police perceptions of
ghetto hostility have engendered a self-fulfilling prophecy of
discordant relations. In 1968 the Kerner Commission canvassed 15
major cities to ascertain police perceptions of ghetto hostility49 and
found that police believed 31 percent of the population to be hostile to
law enforcement agencies. 5 The study concluded that the degree of
hostility perceived by police was much higher than actually existed.51
43. See, e.g., Walsh, Professionalism and the Police, 13 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 705,708-12
(1970). Conservative politicans generally support existing power and social structures, thus
reflecting an acceptance of authority. This conservative ideology tends to coincide with
"conventional" rather than rebellious social values. See AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY, supra
note 40, at 162; SKOLNICK 61.
44. See S. AscH, supra note 26, at 32-34; NIEDERHOFFER 117-21.
45. See Westin, The John Birch Society, 32 COMMNTARY 93, 95, 101-03 (1961).
46. SKOLNICK 57.
47. The Westville, California, morals squad once reflected unanimous opposition to
enforcement of a statutory rape statute since they admitted that they might have availed
themselves of an attractive, willing, 17 year old girl when they were young. Id. at 57.
48. See generally Groves & Rossi, Police Perceptions of a Hostile Ghetto, 13 Am. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 727, 728 (1970).
49. Id. at 73 1.
50. Id. at 732.
51. Id. at 741.
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Various categories of police, however, were more in contact with
reality than others. The police with the most intense quantum of
perceived hostility were highly prejudiced, young, white,52 and
unacquainted with ghetto residents. Correlatively, veteran police,
entertaining only slight racial prejudices and knowledgeable of ghetto
residents were least likely to espouse hostility. The "acquaintance"
variable is particularly interesting since, contrary to the British
system, most American police departments prohibit a policeman
from living in the neighborhood which he patrols. The rationale
underlying this policy is that a policeman who becomes too friendly
with his neighbors will be inhibited in the impartial enforcement of the
law. This reasoning is of questionable validity since many civilians
shun police anyway,5 3 and a modicum of familiarity with residents
leads to improved community relations and more effective law
enforcement. 4 The other important variable, prejudice, could be
eliminated by subjecting all police recruits to a prejudice examination
when they apply to join the force. 5 Any i'ndividual found highly
prejudiced should be disqualified.
This comment has thus far examined the "typical" policeman as
depicted by sociological and psychological studies. Policemen, like
members of any other profession, exhibit individual differences and
nuances. One major criterion, the division between low-professional
and high-professional police, egregiously segregates police into two
camps. The advocates of a highly professional police force envision a
core of college educated, highly disciplined individuals devoid of
strong racial prejudices, concerned with balancing procedural
safeguards and effective law enforcement.56 Highly professional police
differ from their less professional brothers in certain respects. They
are less likely to brutalize suspectss 7 or to project racial prejudice.'
52. Id. at 732. Once the variable of prejudice was accounted for, however, the factor of
whether the policeman was white or black became insignificant.
53. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
54. E.g., TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 144.
55. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
56. NIEDERHOFFER 16-20.
57. Walsh. supra note 43. at 714. Fifty-two percent of highly professional police felt justified
in roughing up a man to effect an arrest, whereas only seven percent felt force was appropriate
when an individual looked or talked tough to the policeman. In contrast. 45 percent of low
professional police felt justified in roughing up a man in the latter case. Id. at 713 (Table 3).
58. Fifty-seven percent of the police who had a low level of professionalism considered racial
and social class as a justifiable distinguishing factor for determining when to use force. Only
twenty percent of the highly professional police responded in the same manner. Id. at 716 (Table
5).
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At the present time, however, low-professional police numerically
dominate most departments. Yet, even if a statistically small number
of police meet highly professional criteria, a wise allocation of such
police to ghetto areas would maximize harmonious community
relations. Unfortunately, the most authoritarian,59 aggressive, and
prejudiced 0 police on most forces are presently assigned to patrol the
troublesome black neighborhoods. That pernicious community
relationships will follow is almost axiomatic.
Race is another palpable difference dividing police into distinct
camps. The division between white and black policemen was once
minuscule for the simple reason that Negroes were systematically
precluded from becoming police.6" In 1940 there were no black
policemen in the five southern states containing the largest Negro
populations,6 2 and as late as 1960 only 3.5 percent of all law
enforcement personnel in the entire nation were non-Caucasian.6 By
1962 there were only 36 black state policemen throughout the United
States, and 24 were located in Illinois.64 These conditions have been
ameliorated somewhat as several cities have recently initiated intense
recruitment programs to secure more black police, but Negroes still
remain drastically under-represented in every level of municipal, state,
and federal law enforcement.6 5 This under-representation stems from
discriminatory selection procedures and the dearth of qualified
59. NIEDERHOFFER 137-39.
60. KERNER COMM'N REP. I1-15. Police while routinely performing their duties utter nearly
every derisive Negro colloquy known to [nan. The chief of the Westville, California, Police
Department promulgated the following order:
As a matter of policy, the following words and other similar derogatory words shall
not be used by members and employees in the course of their official duties or any other
time as to bring the Westville Police Department into disrepute. These words are: boy,
spade, jig, nigger, blue, smoke, coon, spook, headhunter, junglebunny, boogie, stud,
burrhead, cat, black boy, black, shine, ape, spick, mau-mau. The most common display
of a lack of courtesy or objectivity is the use by an officer of unsuitable or offensive
language or mannerisms.
There is particular need to refrain from language which has derogatory connotation
with reference to race, color, religion, or nationality. Such usage by the police causes deep
resentments and antagonism against them. SKOLNICK 80-81.
61. See TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 167-71.
62. Rudwick, The Negro Policeman in the South, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 273 (1960). Even
those southern states with black police restricted their duties to arresting white felons and not
white misdemeanants. It was feared Negro police vested with the latter power might become
*uppity." Id. at 275.
63. TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 10.
64. Id. at 10 & n.42, citing UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE (staff report draft 1963) 13-16.
65. Id. at 10 & n.43, 168; KERNER COMM'N REP. 11-39 to -40.
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Negroes interested in joining a police force."6 Moreover, officials
advocating a highly professional cadre of police officers resist massive
Negro recruitment programs, which require lowered entrance
standards to accommodate the shortage of qualified Negroes. 7
Additional factors militating against greater representation of
Negroes on police forces are the potential stigma of being labeled an
"Uncle Tom" and the practice of discriminatorily assigning black
police unfavorable duties.68
Assuming a Negro becomes a policeman and is assigned to patrol
a black neighborhood, how efficaciously does he perform his duties?
Black police might be expected to be overly harsh on black residents
because of a felt need not to be considered predisposed toward
Negroes. But, in general, black police more realistically perceive
actual ghetto hostility, 9 more readily command the respect of black
citizens, more successfully acquire ghetto information, more
intuitively understand ghetto moods, and more expeditiously detect
trouble than their white counterparts. 0 A policeman's conduct
toward a given individual should be triggered by the determination of
whether that individual falls within law-obeying or law-violating
categories, not whether he is of the same racial group as the
policeman. A recent study, however, reports that there is a positive
correlation between the racial background of a policeman and the
degree of familiarity he will tolerate from an individual of the same
racial group.7' Stated succinctly, black police accept greater
harassment from black residents before responding with hostility than
do white police. The direct consequence to the ghetto of more
emphatic police personel is less inimical interaction between police
and citizens.
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE POLICE PRACTICES IN BLACK
NEIGHBORHOODS
The previous section attempted to identify and evaluate the
psycho-sociological characteristics of most policemen. This section
66. TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 168-69.
67. NIEDERHOFFER 196.
68. Negro police are usually assigned to foot patrols rather than desk jobs and by-passed for
promotion. TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 171-73.
69. Groves & Rossi, supra note 48. at 732.
70. See TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 167.
71. Scott, Racial Group Membership. Role Orientation, and Police Conduct A mong Urban
Policemen, 31 PHYLON 5. 10 (1970).
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will attempt to portray the counterproductive manifestations arising
from these personality attributes.
Physical Brutality
Most people envision physical excesses as the most common and
deleterious type of conduct employed by police to harass Negroes.
While physical brutality has been a serious problem in the past-and
remains a serious problem in parts of the South-the problem is now
less severe. 72 As noted previously, the primary event triggering
unwarranted physical excesses by police is a challenge to their
authority. 73 Because juveniles are particularly eager to prove their
manliness and nerve, they frequently decline to submit to a
policeman's assertion of authority. 74 This problem is further
exacerbated by the fact that the mean age in most ghettos is under 2 175
although several police departments have responded to this wave of
juvenile hubris by condoning youth harassment. 7 In addition to
juveniles certain other classes of Negroes provoke prejudiced
policemen by their mere presence. Black "studs" and black men with
white dates are regarded as "symbolic assailants" and are
particularly vulnerable to police hostility.77
Verbal A b use
The major source of citizen complaints is not physical excesses,
but verbal abuse of an "ethnic nature. 78 This form of verbal
brutality is particularly abrasive when directed toward black women
or juveniles. 9 Youths are especially insecure, mercurial, and defensive
concerning insinuations demeaning their self-dignity and are likely to
object to any verbal attack. The tone of voice employed by the officer
may evoke a visceral response from the object of the abuse. The issue
involved, the "dignity and respect due to each individual from his
72. TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 181-82.
73. See notes 34 & 57 supra and accompanying text.
74. KERNER COMM'N REP. 11-10; Weiler, "Who Shall Watch the Watchmen?" Reflections
on Some Recent Literature About the Police, I I CRiM. L.Q. 420,428 (1969).
75. KERNER COMM'N REP. 11-10.
76. Id.
77. See Crockett, Racism in the Law, 33 Sci. & Soc. 223, 227 (1969).
78. See W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 177-78 (1966); Weiler, supra note 74,
at 424-25.
79. See W. GELLHORN. supra note 78, at 177-78 n.77 (1966); KERNER COMM'N REP. 11-09 to
-I1; Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1165 (1966).
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government,""0 is of no small import in light of the increased pride
exhibited by Negroes in their history, culture, and heritage.8 Most
police use a wide array of biting epithets in the ordinary performance
of their duties.8 Part of this phenomenon is attributable to the fact
that police by nature shun euphemisms; 8 3 but since the consequences
of verbal abuse are so inimical to objective, racially unbiased law
enforcement, some police departments have ordered an end to such
conduct. 8' A final form of verbal abuse provoking black hostility and
counter-prejudices is the police practice of refusing to address
Negroes by an appropriate prefix such as Mister or Miss and the use
of an individual's first name rather than his last." The goal of amiable
police-ghetto relationships is unattainable as long as verbal insults
impinge upon the dignity of black citizens. Since naked prejudice
underpins most verbal assaults, it is easy to understand why
overreaction often follows.
Police Discretion"6
It is obviously impossible for the police to enforce every law that
exists in statute and case books. The limited number of police
personnel, the relative innocuousness of certain forbidden conduct,
and the inability of other organs of the legal process-courts, prisons,
and prosecutors-to accommodate strict enforcement preclude
enforcing every law "to the letter." Thus, police officials must utilize
discretion in ascertaining which laws will be enforced. In large part
this discretion is shared severally by the community power structure."
Once it is determined which laws are to be enforced, however, the
police alone must execute this determination. The most obvious
improper use of police discretion occurs when officers continually
arrest the members of one race for a violation of a specific law but
80. Reich, supra note 79, at 1164.
8 I. See generally Crockett. supra note 77. at 229.
82. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
83. SKOLNICK 82.
84. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
85. Rinella 780. c Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.. 392 U.S. 409,446 (1968): "A state court
judge in Alabama convicted a Negro woman of contempt of court because she refused to answer
him when he addressed her as 'Mary.' although she made the simple request to be called 'Miss
Hamilton.~"
86. See generally Tieger. Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement. 1971 DuKE
L.J. 717.
87. "The police function [is] to support and enforce the interests of the dominant political.
social, and economic interests of the town, and only incidentally to enforce the law." Westley.
The Police: A Sociological Study' of Law. Custom. and Morality 38 (unpub. doc. thesis 1951).
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decline to arrest members of another race for the same violation.
Several examples are the high incidence of inebriation, 8 loitering, and
resisting arrest violations reported in ghetto areas9 as compared to
those reported in low-income white areas. Only a minute fraction of
the aggregate police-citizen contacts ever receive judicial or other
official review.9" Thus, the low visibility of police conduct serves to
reinforce their virtually untrammelled discretion."
A second aspect of the misuse of police discretion is the practice of
"aggressive preventive patrol."9 2 This tactic involves the influx of
motorized police corps cruising ghetto neighborhoods without
warning and initiating "intensive, often indiscriminate, street stops
and searches." 93 Such conduct clearly violates the constitutional
safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizure,9" may impinge
upon the right of association and mobility, and arguably provokes
hostile black counterprejudices and attitudes. The benefit gained, if
any, in crime prevention must be weighed against the ill will fostered
in the black community. This latter consideration weighs heavy since
it is axiomatic that without adequate cooperation from the
community, police are unable to efficiently accomplish their law
enforcement duties.9" Furthermore, there are strong indications that
aggressive preventive patrolling has been employed to supersede, not
supplement, ordinary police services and has resulted in a neglect of
the latter services.9" A closely related technique employed by some
large city police bureaus is to assign a quota of stop and frisk reports
to police patrolling high crime areas.9 7 These quotas result in a
88. Cf. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice. 69 YALE L.J. 543, 575 n.66 (1960).
89. See G. MYRDAL. AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 968 (Twentieth Anniversary ed., Harper &
Row 1962). It is crucial to distinguish police discrimination from other factors responsible for
racially disparate consequences. For example, a middle-class white and a lower-class black may
both be arrested for disorderly conduct. The white will be able to post bond, but the black will
have to remain in jail. Here the unequal consequences are a result of economic, not racial,
differences. There is the possibility, however, that police will arrest blacks with the knowledge
th,, raising bail poses serious difficulties for them.
90. See generally Goldstein, supra note 88, at 575 n.67.
91. See id.; SKOLNICK 231.
92. KERNER COMM'N REP. 11-12.
93. Id.
94. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
95. TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 144-45; KERNER COMM'N REP. 11 -4.
96. Hahn & Feagin 192.
97. KERNER CoM'I".N REP. 11-13. "JRace has an undue influence on who is stopped."
TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 184.
Vol. 1971:751]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
mandatory number of police-citizen encounters demeaning the
character of the recipient and creating residual anti-police sentiments.
The final counterproductive misuse of discretion is the erroneous
decision to refuse to retreat from a minor confrontation. Such
confrontations may arise in a variety of circumstances, but one
documented example discloses the essential characteristics common
to all. A Negro improperly parks his car while his wife enters a store.
A white policeman questions the double-parking and receives a loud
and disrespectful answer from the driver. "Sharp words are
exchanged, followed by arrest, blows, and eventual charges of
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and assault and battery on a
policeman.""8 Although the policeman's response in this situation
was predictable,99 it is nonetheless unfortunate. At the point when the
driver became disrespectful, the policeman had the choice of calmly
admonishing him to move on or to arrest him for disorderly conduct.
The latter course was certain to further exacerbate the driver's
uncooperative attitude over the relatively minor issue of improper
parking. The inappropriate choice led to unnecessary violence.
Another fertile source of black dissatisfaction with police service
is, ironically, the failure of police to provide adequate protection
within the ghetto. 0 The complaints may be roughly divided into two
categories. First, police tolerate a much higher degree of illegal
activity in black neighborhoods than in suburbia.'0' Second, calls for
assistance from ghetto residents receive less timely responses than
calls from white communities.' 2 Excessive crime toleration stems
from the police opinion that violence is a common and accepted mode
of behavior in the ghetto. Thus, police rationalize that if both actors
in an assault are black no harm threatens the black community and
no need exists to provide police deterrence. 03 Furthermore, the high
98. Schwartz, Complaints Against the Police: Experience of the Community Rights
Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1023. 1032 (1970).
99. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
100. KERNER COMM'N REP. 11-21, Krantz & Kramer. The Urban Crisis and Crime, 50
B.U.L. REV. 343. 344 (1970).
101. KERNER Comm ,* REP. 11-21. The ghetto area of Hartford, Connecticut. attracts over
one-third of the daylight burglaries in the city yet receives only one of the city's 18 daytime
patrol cars. Note. Program Budgeting for Police Departments. 76 YAL L.J. 822 (1967).
102. KERNER COMM*N REP. 11-23; Feagin. Home-Defense and the Police, 13 Am. BEIIAV.
SCIENTIST 797, 799 (1970). Cleveland police take four times as long to respond to burglary calls
from the black district as from their next slowest reaction district. Hahn & Feagin 189.
103. Goldstein. supra note 88. at 575.
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incidence of violent crimes in ghetto neighborhoods would dissipate
limited police resources to the point of ignoring other duties.'
Police procedures in ghetto areas attract diametrically opposite
criticism. They are accused on the one hand of allowing criminal
permissiveness in black areas and of not -sponding to calls for
assistance. On the other hand, they are blamed for instituting
oppressive "aggressive patrol practices" and of verbally or physically
mistreating those black residents whom they encounter. The problem
is one of major proportions and unusual complexity. Any solution
must begin with a more professional police and improved police-
community relations.
NEGRO ANTIPATHY TOWARD POLICE
The first two sections of this comment analyzed underlying
psycho-sociological causes motivating racial misconduct by police
and their resultant manifestations. But one must also understand the
attitudinal perspectives with which Negroes view white police. At the
outset it should be emphasized that whatever conception the Negro
has of white police is shaped partly by his opinion of the larger white
community. Negroes justifiably feel that Caucasians have foreclosed
them from equal employment, housing, recreational, and educational
opportunities, and that regardless of their abilities and efforts they
will receive what is left after "Whitey" has taken the cream. 05 A
black judge has identified incidents of racism embedded in the
American legal system which exacerbate the difficulty facing qualified
Negroes searching for suitable employment. One example is the civil
service provision permitting anyone of the top three eligible
candidates to be chosen for the job, thus providing an opportunity to
by-pass qualified Negroes. 06 Black cognizance of systematic
discrimination has engendered extreme bitterness toward white
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., J. LOHMAN, THE POLICE AND MINORITY GROUPS 62 (Chi. Park Dist. 1947);
McCord & Howard, Negro Opinions in Three Riot Cities, 11 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 24, 25
(1968). Malcolm X sums up this feeling in THE AUToBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 16 (1965):
This was my first lesson about gambling: if you see somebody winning all the time, he
isn't gambling, he's cheating. Later on in life, if I were continuously losing in any
gambling situation, I would watch very closely. It's like the Negro in America seeing the
white man win all the time. He's a professional gambler; he has all the cards and the odds
stacked on his side. and he has always dealt to our people from the bottom of the deck.
106. Crocket, supra note 77, at 228.
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America. 0 7 Cogent evidence of the pervasive dissatisfaction harbored
by Negroes against the existing legal system was demonstrated by a
1967 Detroit survey which found that 92 percent of all Negroes
interviewed did not believe that "most of the laws on the books are
fair to all people."'' 18 The problem is compounded when Negroes feel
that inherently unfair laws are then enforced in a discriminatory
manner. 019
In light of the overwhelming black antipathy toward the white
power structure, how does the Negro evaluate the policeman's role
within this structure? The negative reaction encountered by white
police in black neighborhoods is lucidly portrayed by James Baldwin:
The only way to police a ghetto is to be oppressive. None of the Police
Commissioner's men, even with the best will in the world, have any way of
understanding the lives led by the people they swagger about in twos and threes
controlling. Their very presence is an insult, and it would be, even if they spent
their entire day feeding gumdrops to children. They represent the force of the
white world, and that world's criminal profit and ease, to keep the black man
corralled up here, in his place. The badge, the gun in the holster, and the
swinging club make vivid what will happen should his rebellion become overt
... [Hie is facing, daily and nightly, people who would gladly see him dead,
and he knows it. There is no way for him not to know it: there are few things
under heaven more unnerving than the silent, accumulating contempt and
hatred of a people. He moves through Harlem, therefore, like an occupying
soldier in a bitterly hostile country; which is precisely what, and where he is,
and is the reason he walks in twos and threes."0
107. A black intellectual after the 1967 Detroit riots expressed the feelings of the black
community:
If you know the culture and gain access to the heart of the community, you come up
with one astounding pattern and that is, they hate Whitey -they literally hate Whitey, all
of them. And even with the middle-class Negroes-you're not going to get them to say,
"'Let's go and kill Whitey!" or something like that, you're not going to get that-but I'll
tell you what. Try talking to them about their jobs. Where the highest level among many
of them is to get to be some kind of supervisor, and they know damn well they're smarter
than the honky who's over them. Get them talking about that sometime ....
Everybody, well, not everybody, but particularly the liberals do not want to face the aura
of hate that is inside the community. They don't want to deal with it. They don't want to
deal with the tremendous racial aspect of what has happened. It's just too ugly.
Grimshaw, Three Views of Urban Violence: Civil Disturbance. Racial Revolt, Class Assault, I I
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 2, 5 (1968).
New Jersey Governor Richard J. Hughes has expressed a different perspective of the race
riots: ". . . open rebellion . . . criminal insurrection ...an atrocity . . plain and simple
crime and not a civil rights protest." Id. at 4.
108. Hahn & Feagin 185.
109. Id.
110. J. BALDWIN, NOBODY KNows MY NAME 65-67 (1961).
[Vol. 1971:751
POLICE MISCONDUCT
The policeman is thus a symbol of white culture."' In fact, he is the
arm of the society which continually and immediately translates rules
into actual conduct in the ghetto. It is not difficult to understand why
the police bear the brunt of black animosity.
A sampling of polls conducted both before and after the riots of
the 1960's elucidates black perception of police service. After the 1965
Watts riot, 41 percent of the black residents placed police service in
either "poor" or "not good" categories.12 In the same year 86
percent of Oakland Negroes opined that police could not be classified
as either excellent, fair, or neutral, while 56 percent believed police to
be abusive." '3 In a 1966 Harris Poll, forty-one percent of black
respondents in the North and West considered local police more
harmful than helpful to black rights and over 80 percent of Detroit
Negroes in 1967 believed that police did not enforce the laws
equally."' These figures should be compared with a survey indicating
that 77 percent of the general public considered police service to be
either very good or pretty good." 5 Finally, the 1964 Harlem, the 1965
Watts, and the 1967 Detroit"' studies demonstrated that nearly half
of the black residents believed police brutality was a serious problem,
while a 1965 Gallup poll found that only 9 percent of the general
public believed "there [was] any police brutality. . .117 An
overwhelming majority of Negroes consider police to be corrupt and
dishonest." 8 A 1966 St. Louis study found that nearly half of that
city's Negroes felt most citizens were "afraid" to contact their
police."' This latter figure may reflect in part the opinion of many
Negroes that even if they do call the police, service will be slow 20 and
hence relatively worthless.
It is probable that black perceptions of police brutality are not
based entirely on actual brutality, but represent a conditioned
response. A large portion of the black community in northern ghettos
has recently migrated from the South. Many of these Negroes vividly
IlI. E.g., id.; Fogelson 220-21; Rinella 798.
112. Hahn & Feagin 183.
113. McCord & Howard, supra note 105, at 25.
114. Hahn & Feagin 183, 185.
115. TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 145.
116. See Hahn & Feagin 187-88.
117. TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 146.
118. Hahn, supra note 2, at 777 n.2. ("[A]pproximately ninety percent [of Twelfth Street
ghetto residents] asserted that 'most Detroit police break the rules for their personal gain."').
119. TASK FORCE: THE POLICE 144.
120. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
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recollect the brutal nature of southern law enforcement and have
transferred their perceptions of southern police to northern law
enforcement officials.
Prejudiced, overworked, frustrated, and authoritarian police have
been depicted working within a dirty, crime-infested black ghetto
emanating an overwhelming hatred of white police. In this charged
atmosphere of interracial tension, incidents of brutality by both
Negroes and police are inevitable. The remainder of this comment will
discuss the federal civil remedies available to redress racially
motivated police misconduct.
FEDERAL CIVIL REMEDIES FOR POLICE BRUTALITY UNDER SECTIONS
1981 AND 1983
Section 1983
The issue of policing the police has received considerable attention
in the last decade. A panoply of administrative,'"' civilian, 2 ' state
judicial, t23 and federal judicial remedies' have been proposed and
121. E.g., Schwartz, supra note 98 (the author discusses the conflict of interest and
inefficacy resulting from having a division of the District Attorney's Office handle police
misconduct complaints); Comment, Use of § 1983 to Remedy Unconstitutional Police
Conduct: Guarding the Guards. 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS Civ, Lia. L. REv. 104 (1970) (the
Comment proposed that the court appointed masters or monitors work within the police
department and oversee police conduct); Comment, Grievance Response MechanismsJor Police
Misconduct. 55 VA. L. REv. 909, 935-46 (1969).
122. E.g.. Barton, Civilian Review Boards and the Handling of Complaints Against the
Police, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 448 (1970): Beral & Risk, The Administration oJ Complaints by
Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARv. L. REv. 499 (1964); Coxe. The Philadelphia Police
Advisory Board, 2 L. IN TRANS. 179 (1965); Cray, Annotated Bibliography on Police Review
Boards. 3 L. IN TRANS. 197 (1966); Locke, Police Brutality and Civilian Review Boards: A
Second Look. 44 J. URBAN L. 625 (1967): Murdy, Civilian Review Boards in Review. 35 FBI L.
ENFORCE. BULL. 7 (1966); Norris, Constitutional Law Enjorcement is Effective Law
Enforcement: Toward a Concept oj Police it a Democracy and a Citizens' Advisory Board. 43
U. DET. L.J. 203 (1965); Comment. Police-Philadelphia's Police Advisory Board-A New
Concept in Community Relations. 7 VILL. L. REv. 656 (1962).
123. See. e.g.. Foote. Tort Remediesfior Police Violations oJ Individual Rights. 39 MINN. L.
REV. 492 (1965): 55 VA. L. REv.. supra note 121. at 916-20. 927-28. 930-31: Comment. Tort
Liability of Law Enjbrcement OJficers: State Remedies. 29 LA. L. R.v. 130 (1968). Cy. Hall.
The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems. 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 345 (1936)
124. The feasibility of a class action against police misconduct is explored in Comment.
Lawless Law Enforcement, 4 Loy. L. REv. 161 (1971).
In addition to the federal civil remedies for police misconduct, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
provides a federal criminal remedy for the "deprivation [under color of law] of any rights.
privileges, or immunities secured . . .by the Constitution or laws of the United States," While
this remedy is available to redress police brutality, certain constraining factors have impaired its
usefulness. One must prove the defendant possessed a "specific intent" to deprive the grievant of
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with varying degrees of competency examined. The workhorse of
federal civil rights litigation is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.125 The 1961
a constitutional right, not merely a "generally bad purpose." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 103 (1945). However, an objective test for such intent has been deemed sufficient to sustain a
conviction. Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746, 750 (5th Cir. 1947). But even if the plaintiff is
successful, the statute prescribes a maximum fine of $1,000 and one year imprisonment. "IT]he
statute has become a fragile weapon in the armory of the Department of Justice." Shapiro,
Limitations in Prosecuting Civil Rights Violations, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 532 (1961).
125. Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13, codified, Revised Statutes
of 1878, § 1979 (2d ed.) now, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). In the years immediately following the
Civil War the Reconstruction Congress conceived of and passed three Constitutional
Amendments, U.S. CoNsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, and five civil rights acts. Act of April 9,
1866, ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27; Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140; Act of February 28, 1871, 16
Stat. 433; Ku Klux Klan Act of April 30, 1871, 17 Stat. 13; Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335.
The purposes of these acts as revealed by legislative history are succinctly stated in R. CARR,
FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD, 37-40 (1947). This flurry of
legislative activity was born of a twin desire to reprimand the southern states for the costly Civil
War and to implement the freedom promised the Negro by the Emancipation Proclamation.
The third of the five civil rights acts, presently codified as section 1983 of title 42 of the
United States Code, was originally enacted on April 20, 1871. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redreis.
Known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, the Anti-lynching Act, and the Third Civil Rights Act, this
statute was designed to "enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment" and to halt the
priactices of organized bands of Caucasian southerners attempting to deprive the freedmen of
their newly acquired rights. It is reasonably clear that the framers intended the Act to apply to
private individuals such as Klansmen and not merely to persons acting under "color" of state
law. Cf. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (1871). See also Gressman, The Unhappy
History of Civil Rights Litigation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1339-40 (1952).
In their zeal to protect the rights of the Negro, however, the draftsmen overlooked potential
weaknesses in their choice of statutory language. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
554-55 (1875), the Supreme Court held that the first section of the fourteenth amendment
applied only to state action, not to private conduct. Accord, Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S.
I, 14 (1906). Once the fourteenth amendment was precluded from protecting the freedman from
private action, civil rights legislation enacted pursuant to the fifth section thereof was assured a
similar fate. In United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), the Court predictably declared
unconstitutional the criminal conspiracy provision of the Ku Klux Klan Act which purported to
proscribe lynchings and gang atrocities by private groups. Perhaps the most devastating judicial
negation of the civil rights legislation was visited by the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 74, 79 (1873). There the Court interpreted the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment to protect only the incidents of national citizenship, such as the right to
sue in federal court and the right to travel to the national capitol, and not to protect the incidents
of state citizenship. The privileges and immunities clause of the 1871 Act was accorded the same
restrictive interpretation in Cruikshank. Finally, it was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court
answered negatively a question as basic as whether exhaustion of state civil rights remedies must
precede resort to section 1983. See note 126 infra and accompanying text.
Given the judicial antipathy toward "the reconstruction legislation, it is not surprising that
Vol. 1971:751 ]
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
landmark case of Monroe v. Pape'26 established section 1983 as a
viable means of obtaining relief for torts committed by law
enforcement officials. In the interim between 1961 and the present, the
utility of section 1983 has matured to the point where it is the basis for
nearly every federally instituted claim alleging police brutality." 7
Elements of a Section 1983 Action. Section 1983 explicitly
indicates that a proper party plaintiff is "any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof."'25 The courts,
applying.this language literally, have allowed aliens to invoke the
Act' protection.' It is clear that a victim of police brutality qualifies
as a plaintiff under the Act. 30
Although -section 1983 provides a cause of action for police
brutality, it does not confer jurisdiction. The plaintiff must choose
there were only 21 reported cases predicated on the Ku Klux Klan Act from the date of its
inception until 1920. See generally Comment. The Civil Rights Act: Emergence ol an Adequate
Federal Civil Remedy?. 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). Brawner v. Irwin. 169 F. 964. 965 (N.D.
Ga. 1909), the earliest significant case employing the precursor to section 1983 for redress of
police brutality, demonstrates the inimical attitude adopted by the federal courts toward
reconstruction legislation. A local police chief had allegedly "cruelly assaulted and beat [en] [the
plaintiff, a black woman], with a whip, cutting her flesh in scars." arrested and imprisoned her.
and subsequently released her without filing charges. The court, relying on the Slaughterhouse
Cases, held that the "right of an individual to life. liberty, and property, and to be free from
molestation" is a right adhering to state citizenship and hence beyond the purview of the
privileges and immunities secured by the fourteenth amendment and the Ku Klux Klan Act. Id.
at 966. Although the court in Brawner construed the Ku Klux Klan Act with a heavier hand than
most courts had, 30 years transpired before the Supreme Court in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,
527 (1939), foretold a change in judicial attitude toward the old civil rights acts by interpreting
section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983. to protect the privileges of
free speech and peaceful assembly from inimical state action.
126. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), noted in Sperber. Monroe v. Pape: Redress Under the Civil
Rights Acts Redefined. 21 LAW IN TRANS. 197 (1961); Comment. The Civil Rights Acts and
Mr. Monroe, 49 CAL. L. REV. 145 (1961); Note. Constitutional Law: "'Under Color Of' Law
and the Civil Rights Act, 1961 DuKE L.J. 452; The Supreme Court. 1960 Term. 75 HARV. L.
REV. 40, 211 (1961); 4 ARIZ. L. REv. 105 (1962); 12 MERCER L. REv. 410 (1961); 37 N.D.L.
REV. 433 (1961); 38 U. DET. L.J. 655 (1961): 15 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1961). For an analysis of
the judicial progeny of Monroe, see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the
Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277. 297 (1965).
127. Successful damage actions since 1950 under § 1983 against police are compiled and
summarized in Ginger & Bell, Police Misconduct Litigation -Plaintiff's Remedies. 15 A i. JuR.
TRIALS 555, 580-90 (1968).
128. See note 125 supra.
129. Eg., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915).
130. Some question exists whether artificial persons such as corporations fall within the
.person" language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Most courts have answered the issue in the
affirmative. The United States. however, is not a "person." See Note. The Civil Rights Act of
1871: Continuing Validity. 40 NOTRE DA.%, LAW. 70. 74 (1964).
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either sections 1343 or 133113, as a jurisdictional springboard into the
federal district courts. The jurisdictional requirements of section
1343(3) are satisfied by demanding damages or equitable relief under
section 1983 since the latter is "an Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens .... ,,132 If the plaintiff chooses to premise
federal district court jurisdiction on section 1331, he must allege that
the matter in controversy exceeds 10,000 dollars and that his cause of
action arises under a law of the United States. The second
requirement is fulfilled by basing one's claim on section 1983, but the
first prerequisite may prove difficult since the value of a civil right
arguably is not measurable in dollars and cents.'3
Section 1983 dictates that "every person" acting under color of
law to deprive another of any right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States "shall be liable to the party
injured. . . -,31 The primary prerequisite subjecting one to the
sanctions of the Act appears to be that the potential defendant has
acted under color of state law. The courts have followed this directive
by excluding federal officers'3 and private individuals' 6 from 1983
coverage. It appeared, nevertheless, that the otherwise sweeping
language might be construed literally when Picking v. Pennsylvania
R.R. held that "Congress gave a right of action sounding in tort to
every individual whose federal rights were trespassed upon by any
officer acting under pretense oJstate law."'317 But the courts, fearful of
a rash of irresponsible suits against members of the legislative,
judicial, and executive branches of the government,138 have engrafted
further exceptions to the clear mandate that "every person" shall be
liable. In Tenney v. Brandhove39 the Supreme Court declared that the
131. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331. 1343 (1964).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964). For a general discussion of jurisdictional aspects of a
1983 cause of action see Note, Civil Procedure: Section 1343(3) Jurisdiction and the Property-
Personal Right Distinction. 1970 DuKE L.J. 819.
133. Cf. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 507-08, 529-32 (1939) (opinions of Roberts, J., and
Stone, J.).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
135. E.g., Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964). cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981
(1965).
136. E.g., Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855, 856 (1956).
137. 151 F.2d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1945) (emphasis added), decided on remand, 5 F.R.D. 280
(M.D. Pa.), 66 F. Supp. 233 (M.D. Pa. 1946), affd, 160 F.2d 106 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 332
U.S. 776 (1947), overruled, Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1966). cert. denied. 386
U.S. 1021 (1967).
138. E.g.. Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791, 793 (2d Cir. 1946) (Hand, J.).
139. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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drafters of the Ku Klux Klan Act did not intend to abolish the
common law doctrine of legislative immunity 40 and that state
legislators were not subject to the restrictions of the Act. This thesis
has been adopted and expanded by subsequent decisions to exclude
state judges, t4t prosecuting attorneys,' probation officers,' and
other quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative officials in the exercise of their
official duties. 44
The issue of whether police are also cloaked with a form of
executive or discretionary immunity was answered negatively by
Monroe v. Pape."' Thus, a private party alleging police brutality
against an individual policeman will not be denied recovery for failure
to sue a proper party defendant. But while Monroe did not exempt
police from liability, it also held that municipalities and any arm
thereof are protected by sovereign immunity. 46 This holding thus
exempts a city and its police department from vicarious liability for
the- torts of its police-employees. Most police assure that they are
judgment-proof by assigning all of their property to their wives;' but
even if they fail to use such a subterfuge, their low salary precludes the
satisfaction of a judgment against them.46
Many plaintiffs victimized by police misconduct are thus left
without a financially responsible defendant amenable to suit. Since
occasional police torts are an inevitable cost of effective law
enforcemient and the police act as representatives of the municipality
or state, rather than in a private capacity, this cost should be borne by
the entity most capable of doing so. The municipality can best absorb
140. Id. at 376. Legislative history underlying'the 1871 Act indicates Congressional intent to
preclude certain immunities as defenses to actions under the Act. See46 COLUM. L. REv. 614
(1946).
141. E.g.. Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965): Curry v. Ragan, 257 F.2d 449
(5th Cir.). cert. denied. 358 U.S. 851 (1958); Francis v. Crafts. 203 F.2d 809 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied. 346 U.S. 835 (1953). See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
142. E.g.. Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.). cert. denied. 379 U.S. 915 (1964): Stift
v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); Kenney v. Fox. 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.). cert. denied. 352
U.S. 855 (1956). But see Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965).
143. E.g.. Dunn v. Estes. 117 F. Supp. 146 (D. Mass. 1953).
144. Some question exists whether executive immunity is a defense to a § 1983 claim. See
Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855. 862 (5th Cir. 1964). cert. denied. 380 U.S. 981 (1965).
145. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
146. Id.
147. Avins. 'qual Protection Against Unnecessary Police Violence and the, Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment: .4 Comnment. 19 BUfALO L. REv. 599 n.7
(1970).
148. See Hall. supra note 123. at 346-48.
[*Vol. 1971:751
POLICE MISCONDUCT
the costs inflicted upon citizens by the law enforcement process and
most equitably redistribute that cost to the citizenry in the form of
taxes. Moreover, if a municipality realizes that it must reimburse
police brutality victims, it will be more circumspect in hiring police
with overly aggressive personalities. But despite supplications for the
municipality to bear the costs resulting from the misconduct of its
police, 14 9 this approach has not been adopted in enforcing section
1983.'1
Types of Police Misconduct Actionable Under Section 1983.
Commentators 51 and courts 52 have discussed at length whether the
deprivation of any right secured by the original Bill of Rights and
applied to the states by way of the fourteenth amendment constitutes
a cause of action under section 1983. The Ku Klux Klan Act explicitly
provides a remedy for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United
States]." The Supreme Court in Monroe clarified the breadth of these
words by holding that
[a]llegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of
a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies . . . the
requirement of [section 1983] . . . . [T]he guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment has been made
applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'1
Since 1961 a number of other amendments have been incorporated
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A natural
application of Monroe indicates that a denial of these additional
absorbed rights also states a claim under section 1983. 51 The
149. Smeltz v. Copeland. 440 Pa. 224, -, 269 A.2d 466, 468 (1970) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting); Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers
in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. L.J. 889, 890 (1965); Comment, Tort Liability of Law
Enjorcement Ojficers Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 30 LA. L. REv. 100, 116-18
(1969).
150. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961). The trend in state courts is to abolish
sovereign immunity, but several states still adhere to the doctrine. E.g.. Smeltz v. Copeland, 440
Pa. 224, 269 A.2d 466 (1970).
151. E.g.. Shapo. supra note 126, at 321; Comment, The Civil Rights Acts and Mr.
Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 145, 159-61 (1961).
152. E.g.. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939); Powell v. Workmen's Compensation
Bd.. 327 F.2d 131, 136-37 (2d Cir. 1964).
153. 365 U.S. 167. 171 (1961).
154. See York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964) (first
amendment violation of right of privacy states fourteenth amendment due process claim under
section 1983). The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment will also sustain a claim
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significance of this development goes beyond the limited category of
cases involving police brutality to override the argument that the Bill
of Rights is merely a shield and not a sword. An aggrieved party may
fashion a viable remedy by framing a denial of a right secured by the
first eight amendments in terms of a section 1983 cause of action.
Facts alleging an unreasonable search and seizure,' unlawful
arrest,"'6 or false imprisonment' 7 may thus be posited on the
fourteenth amendment to overcome the threshold issue of stating a
claim under section 1983. But on what theory should police
misconduct involving physical abuse or mere verbal discourtesy be
premised? The fundamental constitutional privilege against
unreasonable and illegal physical abuse has usually been founded
upon the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' "
Police Intent. A more difficult question arises when the police
misconduct involves merely a slight push or verbal insult. In Monroe
the Supreme Court stated that a claim alleging, police misconduct
sounded in tort and that the Ku Klux Klan Act "should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible
for the natural consequences of his actions."' Several courts initially
refused to apply the above standard on the fear that it would result in
something approaching strict liability for police misconduct.' Police
are required to think and act quickly under the pressure of extreme
stress and rapidly changing circumstances. Thus, to make them liable
for the "natural consequences" of their acts would arguably impair
the execution of their duties. Furthermore, federal courts might be
deluged with frivolous litigants'' demanding officious interference by
under section 1983. Moss v. Hornig. 314 F.2d 89.92 (2d Cir. 1963). Cf. Huey V. Barloga, 277 F.
Supp. 864, 873 (N.D. III. 1967).
155. See generally Comment. Civil Rights Act Section 1983 and Illegal Search by State
Officials. 10 STAN. L. REv. 347 (1958).
156. See Daly v. Pedersen, 278 F. Supp. 88 (D. Minn. 1967).
157. Cf Truitt v. State. 278 F.2d 819. 820 (7th Cir.). cert, denied. 364 U.S. 866 (1960):
Bradford v. Lefkowitz. 240 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" 158. E.g., Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338. 340 (loth Cir. 1966). But see Jenkins v. Averett.
424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970) (claim founded upon violation of fourth amendment).
159. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). In Monroe 13 Chicago policemen broke into plaintiffs
home, forced he and his wife at gunpoint to stand naked in the living room, insulted them. struck
Mr. Monroe with a flashlight, and kicked his children.
160. Cy Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529, 530 (7th Cir. 1961). But see Joseph v. Rowlen.
402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968).
16 1. See Note. Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape. 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1486; 1493 (1969). But see Chevigny. Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply. 83 -IARv. L.
REv. 1352. 1354-55 (1970).
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federal courts in state police administration.6 2 In light of these
restraining considerations, a district court in Bargainer v. Michal'1
held that to plead and prove a claim under section 1983 the plaintiff
must allege that an ulterior motive or bad purpose existed in the mind
of the policeman but not that the policeman had a specific intent to
deprive the plaintiff of a particular constitutional right. This standard
should be compared with the recent liberal interpretation offered in
Jenkins v. Averett' 6' where an unarmed black youth, offering no
resistance, claimed damages under section 1983 for being shot by a
police officer. Although the district court had found the defendant
"grossly or culpably negligent," it only sustained the plaintiff's
pendent state assault and battery claim, rejecting the section 1983
federal claim. The court of appeals reversed the section 1983
treatment, holding that once a violation of the constitutional right "to
be free from unreasonable interference by police officers"'6 5 has been
made out, "a showing of intent to injure is not a further prerequisite
to recovery under section 1983."166 By eliminating the difficult burden
of proving subjective intent, the Court's holding permits an aggrieved
party to base a claim on the objective standard of "gross
negligence." 67
Severity of Police Misconduct. The desire to prevent an
aggravation of overcrowded court dockets has led at least one court to
establish a minimum level of severity or outrageousness before a
police official's misconduct constitutes a section 1983 deprivation. In
Daly v.,Pedersen' the plaintiff alleged that he was shoved while being
162. Cf. Comment. Federal Comity, Official Immunity, and the Dilemma of Section 1983.
1967 DuKE L.J. 741,756.
163. 233 F. Supp. 270,273 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Accord, Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780,784
(6th Cir. 1963); Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529, 530 (7th Cir. 1961).
164. 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). noted in 23 VAND. L. REV. 1341 (1970).
165. 424 F.2d at 1231.
166. Id. at 1232. The court went further than necessary in its holding, admitting that it could
retain an "intent" requirement, but simply deemed gross and culpable negligence a satisfactory
showing of such intent. Id. Moreover, the dissent criticized the court for turning 1983 into a
general federal negligence statute. Id. at 1234-35. The majority retorted that it had found
arbitrariness. "the raw abuse of power by a police officer," not the infliction of injury in
inadvertence or "simple negligence" and refused to speculate about cases where arbitrariness
could not be shown. Id. at 1232. It should also be noted that the dissent read Averett narrowly,
interpreting it to equate gross and culpable negligence with intent. Id. at 1234.
167. On the successful state claim the plaintiff had originally received only $448, "out of
pocket expenses.- The court ordered an award of further damages for pain and suffering on
remand, and left the question of punitive damages open for further consideration. Id. at 1229,
1233.
168. 278 F. Supp. 88.94 (D. Minn. 1967).
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escorted by police down a courthouse hallway. The court compared
this "trivial battery at best" with the shocking conduct perpetrated in
Screws6' and Monroe17 and rationalized that "the requisite degree of
harm needed to constitute a denial of rights implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" was absent.17' The opinion is correct in discouraging
the institution of lawsuits by every person whose pride has been
injured by a harsh word and mild physical encounter with the police.
A logical extension of the court's holding means that minor verbal
discourtesies also fail to constitute a denial of rights secured by the
fourteenth amendment. But clearly a point exists at which verbal
affronts should rise to the level of a constitutional tort. Following the
tort theory of section 1983 espoused by Monroe v. Pape7 2 and
analogizing to the law of civil defamation, certain insults are as
devastating as a physical assault and deserve recompense where
plaintiff can prove actual damages. Moreover, in one sense verbal
insults are more culpable than minor instances of excessive force. It is
inevitable that police will occasionally arrest a person without
probable cause or employ slightly more force than is necessary to
apprehend a suspect. Such minor mistakes, if they fall within the gray
area of reasonable police discretion, are excusable. On the other hand,
a virulent verbal assault is never necessary for the successful execution
of police duties and can only result in discordant police-civilian
relations. An individual subjected to such verbal abuse may respond
to the affront, further escalating the tension until physical violence
erupts between the protagonists. Given the minimal social benefits
from police verbal abuse and the resulting social costs, the fact that no
battery accompanies a verbal affront should not preclude a successful
action under section 1983.
Section 1981
Until recently section 1983 seemed to offer the only viable federal
remedy for police brutality. But within the last two years, plaintiffs
169. 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (a sheriff beating a Negro suspect to death). Of course. Screws is
only applicable to the 1983 context by analogy since it involved a criminal action under what is
now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
170. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
171. One commentator has suggested that only the "most outrageous" police conduct
should sustain an action under section 1983. 30 LA. L. Rt.v.. supra note 149. at 115. Contra
Cohen v. Norris. 300 F.2d 24. 30-31 (9th Cir. 1962).
172. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
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have begun to employ a potentially broader and more effective device,
section 198l1.3
Legislative History. The first proposed constitutional amendment
of the Reconstruction Congress, the thirteenth amendment, was
ratified on December 18, 1865, having as its purpose both the
denunciation of the legal status of slavery, and the abolition of the
badges and incidents accruing therefrom. 74 Subsequent to
ratification, Senator Trumbull proposed that legislation be enacted to
implement the amendment he had authored. On April 9, 1866, this
proposal became, over President Johnson's veto, the first of five civil
rights acts. 75 Suggestions were made by opponents of the 1866 Act,
however, that the thirteenth amendment was confined to merely
abolishing the status of slavery. 76 If this restrictive reading prevailed,
legislation purporting to abrogate the badges of slavery would be
broader in scope than the amendment itself, and might be deemed
unconstitutional.
The fourteenth amendment was intended to dispel all skepticism
as to the constitutionality of the 1866 Act. 77 In 1870, shortly after the
fourteenth amendment was enacted, Congress reenacted the 1866
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
174. Slaves were denied the right to worship, contract, acquire or hold property, or to be
secure in their personal security. J. TEN BROEK. THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 103, 143-44 (1951).
175. 14 Stat. 27. Section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 originally provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens o] the United States; and
such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery
or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States, to make and enjorce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit.
purchase, lease, sell. hold. and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit oJ all laws and proceedings fbr the security of person and property. as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment. pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law. statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (emphasis added)
Section 2 of the 1866 Act now survives as42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (1964). Section 1981
reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every state and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes. licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
176. J. TENBROEK. supra note 174, at 184.
177. Id. at 185.
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Act, 78 hopefully quashing doubts as to its constitutionality. The
Congressional debates concerning the fourteenth amendment clearly
indicate anxiety over the lawless acts of private individuals in the
South, 17 and the amendment was intended by many congressmen to
curtail private discrimination as well as state action.""0 The
importance of the legislative development of section 1981 lies in the
concerted intent of its authors to reach out and nullify not only the
legality of the master-slave relationship per se, but the "custom"'"8 of
both state officials and private individuals of physically and
economically harassing the Negro after he was "freed."
Judicial Development. Sections 1981 and 1982 are now, of course,
two separate provisions of Title 42 of the United States Code, but
originally both provisions were contained in section one of the Act of
April 9, 1866.182 The two provisions are pari materia and any judicial
reference to section 1982 is directly relevant to the status of section
1981.13
A number of early Supreme Court cases noted in dicta that
sections 1981 and 1982 were inapplicable to the acts of private
persons,'8 but since the legislative history"" and plain language of the
statutes refute this, the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 86 declined to read a color-of-state-law
requirement into section 1982. In defense to a section 1983 suit, police
often allege that their conduct was outside the scope of their official
duties and hence not under color of law. Courts have been reluctant to
accept this defense, stating that it is questionable whether a man with
178. Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. ch. 114. § 18, 16 Stat. 140. 144 (1870).
179. L. WARSOFF. EQUALITY AND THE LAW 109-10 (1938).
180. J. TENBROEK, supra note 174. at 186-87. 208. 220. See L. WARSOFF, supra note 179. at
189-90; H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 220-21, 232. 24546, 277
(1908)..Contra, e.g.. id. at 243-44.
18 1. See Kohl. The Civil Rights Act of 1866. Its Hour Come Round at Last. 55 Va. L. Rev.
272. 283-89 (1969).
182. 14 Stat. 27. See note 175 supra.
183. See Gannon v. Action. 303 F. Supp. 1240. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1969); United States ex reL
Washington v. Chester County Police Dept.. 300 F. Supp. 1279. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Contra
Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212. 1215 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See note 5 supra.
184. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley. 271 U.S. 323. 331
(1926); Buchanon v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1917): Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3. 16-17
(1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1879). See also Kentucky v. Powers. 139 F. 452.
476-77 (E.D. Ky. 1905). rev'd. 201 U.S. I (1906).
185. J. TEN BROECK. supra note 174. at 215-17. 220.
186. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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a badge can ever shed his cloak of police power and, purely in a
private capacity, beat another person.5 7 However, in those instances
where color of law is clearly absent, thereby excluding the defendant
from section 1983 coverage, a remedy exists in section 1981 since the
latter provision applies to private as well as official conduct.'"8
The class of persons entitled to bring a suit under section 1981 is
coterminous with section 1983, section 1981 providing that "[a]ll
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States" shall have the
equal benefit of the laws, and no reason exists for construing this clear
language to mean anything other than what it says. A fundamental
advantage, however, inures in premising a police brutality case on
section 1981 because of the opportunity to name a financially
responsible defendant. Since most police are judgment-proof 89 and
the police department' and city' which employ them are immune
from vicarious liability for the torts of their employees under section
1983, a suit under that section is often a futile effort. In United States
ex rel. Washington v. Chester County Police Department a district
court recently held that the law under section 1981 "is not as clear,
crystalized and well-settled as is the judicial gloss on section 1983";
and, therefore, municipalities may be liable for the torts of their law
enforcement officials. 92 The basis for the court's decision appears to
be that section 1983 provides that "[e]very person" shall be liable for
depriving one of certain rights. Section 1983 is thus addressed to the
defendant in a personal sense. In contrast, section 1981 is framed in
the affirmative and grants to "[a]ll persons" within the jurisdiction of
the United States certain rights. Since the word "persons" is
employed in a different context and refers to a different class of
people, the court did not feel obliged to follow section 1983 precedent.
Although such reasoning may be sheer sophistry, the potential
ramifications of the holding are immense. If Chester County is
followed generally by other courts, an aggrieved plaintiff for the first
time will be assured of recovering the jury-awarded damages for
187. See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1965).
188. E.g., Scott v. Young, 307 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Va. 1969); Gannon v. Action, 303 F.
Supp. 1240, 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1969). Contra, Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala.
1971).
189. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
190. United States ex rel. Washington v. Chester County Police Dept., 294 F. Supp. 1157,
1158 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
191. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
192. 294 F. Supp. 1157, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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it provides that "[a]ll persons. . . shall be subject to like punishment,
pains. . . and exactions [as enjoyed by white citizens]. . . and to no
other." A dominant attribute of slavery was punishment at the will of
the master.'94 This license for cruelty was legalized by slave codes
permitting an owner "in discharge of his responsibilities for the care
and government of slaves" to inflict physical abuse by "whipping, or
beating with a horse whip, cow skin, or putting irons on . . .,.
After slavery was abolished, southern law enforcement officials
utilized their office to perpetuate the custom of anti-Negro
brutality.' 8 Section 1981's requirement of "like punishment, pains
.. . [and] no other" relates directly to physical brutality incident to
slavery. It thus appears that a restriction upon racially motivated
police brutality is embodied in section 198 L"'
Until the recent Supreme Court case of Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc.,'9 the issue of whether money damages were recoverable
under section 1982111 remained open.2® A number of lower federal
courts had previously answered the question negatively but without
providing a rationale to support their holding.20' In contrast, a few
courts had already inferred a right to money damages in a section
1981 action from section 1988.212 Speculation on this matter as to
judicial construction during the first 50 to 70 years of its existence. The present trend of judicial
construction as exemplifed by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.. however, is to enforce the "plain
and unambiguous terms" of the Civil War legislation. 392 U.S. 409, 420 (1968) (re: § 1982). A
fair construction of the plain, unambiguous terms of section 1981 dispells any notion of a racial
membership requirement.
194. W. DuBois. BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 10 (1935) ("Slaves were not
considered men . . . they could be punished at will.-)
195. See J. TEN BROECK. supra note 174. at 103 n.3.
196. (Y. Brawner v. Irwin, 169 F. 964. 966 (C.C. N.D. Ga. 1909).
197. See United States ex rel. Washington v. Chester County Police Dept.. 300 IP. Supp.
1279 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
198. 396 U.S. 229 (1970). notedin 44 TUL. L. REv. 820 (1970).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
200. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.. 392 U.S. 409.414-15 n. 14 (1968).
201. Eg.. Hanna v. Home Ins. Co.. 281 F.2d 298. 303 S(5th Cir. 1960). cert. denied. 365
U.S. 838 (1961): ej. Paynes v. Lee. 239 F. Supp. 1019. 1022 (h.D. La. 1965) (re: § 1981), rev'd
on other grounds. 377 F.2d 61. 64-65 (5th Cir. 1967) (re: § 1985): Watson v. Devlin, 167 F.
Supp. 638. 640 (F.D. Mich. 1958). ajlfd. 268 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1959).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964). See Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan (The Queue Case). 12 Fed. Cas.
252 (Case No. 6.546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (granting judgment to plaintiff on defendant's
demurrer to plaintiffs complaint, in an action for damages): United States ex rel. Washington
v. Chester County Police Dept.. 300 F. Supp. 1279. 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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successful litigation of a difficult police brutality case. Chester
County will surely encourage the initiation of a greater number of
suits against police and thus promote the first effective private remedy
for police misconduct.
The statutory language of section 1981 lends itself particularly to
a cause of action based on racially motivated police brutality9 3 since
193. Section 1981 applicability to other than racially motivated misconduct is questionable.
In Agnew v. City oJ Compton the court stated that an allegation that one was deprived of a
"right which, under similar circumstances, would have been accorded a person of a different
race" is essential to state a cause of action under sections 1981 and 1982. 239 F.2d 226, 230 (9th
Cir. 1956). cert. denied. 353 U.S. 959 (1957), overruled, Cohen v. Norris. 300 F.2d 24, 29 (9th
Cir. 1962). Accord. Quarles v. Texas, 312 F. Supp. 835, 839 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Ambrek v. Clark,
287 F. Supp. 208, 210 (E.D. Pa. 1968); cf. Falk v. Wilson, 313 F. Supp. 727, 728 (D. Del. 1970).
Agnew premised this racial motivation requirement on several early Supreme Court cases, see
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), and on the purpose
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act to assure equality of rights between races. Additional support is
found in the section 1981 language providing that "[a]ll persons. . . shall have the. . . full and
equal benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964)
(emphasis added). See note 172 supra. The reference to "white persons" instills racial overtones
into the Act, thus inviting a court to find a racial requirement. It is submitted, however, that
several considerations indicate that such an interpretation is an unwarranted judicial gloss on the
1866 Act.
The Act of April 9, 1866, originally provided that all citizens "of every race and color" are
entitled to the equal benefit of the laws "as is enjoyed by white citizens." Ch. 3 1, § 1, 14 Stat.
27. Thus. persons of any race were entitled to invoke the protection of the Act. See Gannon v.
Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240, 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1969). Moreover, the Congressional debates reveal
an intent to protect not only the newly freed Negro, but also his white sympathizers. J.
TENBROECK, supra note 174, at 161-62. If a white should be harassed by fellow whites
antagonistic to black freedom, the Caucasian victim was entitled to employ the 1866 Act to
vindicate his injury. The congressional intent is clearly contrary to Agnew since such an
aggrieved white would clearly not be "deprived of a right which, under similar circumstances,
would have been accorded a person of another race." 239 F.2d at 230. In fact, the converse is
true. A black in similar circumstances would probably have incurred even greater harm. Since
the framers of the 1866 Act intended the white sympathizer to be protected by their legislation,
the strict "racial membership" requirement of Agnew is erroneous.
The 1905 circuit court case of Kentucky v. Powers, 139 F. 452,494-95 (C.C. E.D. Ky. 1905),
construed the predecessor to section 1981 in a manner consistent with the theory adopted by this
comment. In Powers a white alleged the denial of the equal protection of the laws through the
systematic exclusion by a state court of those jurors who were of the same political party as the
defendant. Although the motivating force behind this denial of the petitioner's rights was
political, not racial, the court sustained the claim. The cogent interpretation offered by Powers is
supported by the language of the statute. The plain, explicit, and unambiguous terms of section
1981 provide that "[a]ll persons . . . shall have the ... right. . .to the full and equal benefit
of all laws." The subsequent words "as is enjoyed by white citizens" merely establish an
objective standard which qualifies the immediately preceding phrase--"to the full and equal
benefit of all laws." Thus, the two phrases may be paraphrased to read-all persons shall have
the full and equal benefits of the laws enjoyed by white citizens. Construed in this manner, no
element of racism appears in the statute as a prerequisite to stating a valid claim.
As discussed earlier, see note 125 supra, the Reconstruction legislation was subjected to strict
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section 1982 ended when the Court declared in Sullivan"' that
notwithstanding the silence of section 1982 regarding damages, a
money award would lie thereunder. The basic rationale for the
Court's holding was the rule of statutory construction that "the
existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and
appropriate remedies. ' 2"1 The Court's disposition of the issue appears
unassailable from both the standpoint of legislative interpretation and
public policy and complements the previous Supreme Court
treatment accorded the 1866 Civil Rights Act in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.
The only remaining question is whether section 198 1, like section
1982, should be construed to have an implied remedy. The rationale of
Sullivan that a statutory right implies all appropriate remedies is
certainly equally applicable to section 198 1. Furthermore, the Court
in Sullivan read 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to permit the utilization of both
federal and state damage rules to effectuate the policies subsumed
within the Reconstruction Period civil rights acts. 05 The policy of
protecting persons in the enjoyment of their civil rights could hardly
be effectuated without supplying a remedy for the federal rights
contained in section 1981.210 Finally, there appears no reason to
provide a remedy for section 1982, and yet decline to do so for section
1981 since both provisions originally constituted an organic, single
entity in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and are structurally comple-
mentary.
CONCLUSION
Within the last three years a number of significant cases have
revitalized the long dormant Reconstruction Period civil rights acts.
The most far-reaching was Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., which held
section 1982 to apply to private individuals. Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc. quickly followed and provided an effective damage remedy
to implement Jones. Significantly for civil actions against racially
motivated police misconduct, the Fourth Circuit held in Jenkins v.
203. 396 U.S. 229. 238-40 (1970).
204. Id. at 239.
205. 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1970).
206. See notes 175 & 182 supra and accompanying text.
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A verett 27 that an allegation of intent is not required for a section 1983
police misconduct action. 218 In United States ex rel. Washington v.
Chester County Police Department,2"9 a district court found the
defense of sovereign immunity in a section 1981 police brutality case
to be irrelevant.210 The net effect of these decisions is greater than the
sum of its parts. An attitude of judicial liberalism is resurrecting an
entire system of"legislation long considered moribund. The
Reconstruction Period civil rights acts are phrased in "sweeping
terms," '2 1' and the courts are finally giving effect to the "plain and
unambiguous terms" ' 212 contained therein, notwithstanding the
revolutionary ' 213 consequences.
The relevance of such judicial liberalism is the appearance of a
means of redressing one of the most crucial problems facing America
today. The strain between Negroes and the white police who patrol the
American black ghettos occasionally ignites into wholesale civil
disorder. Those brief encounters highlight a pervasive underlying
division between black and white America. Hopefully, by providing
an effective means under the law for controlling police abuse and
compensating the abused, Congress and the judiciary have promoted
improved interracial relationships and closed the gap between the two
Americas.
207. 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
208. Id. at 1232.
209. 294 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
210. Id. at 1158.
211. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 (1968).
212. Id. at 420.
213. Id. at 422.
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